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Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic 
Cleansing: A Return to Established Principles in Light of 
Contemporary Interpretations 
Micol Sirkin† 
“‘The only alternative to ethnic minorities is ethnically pure states 
created by slaughter or expulsion.’”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It may be surprising to discover that ethnic cleansing is legally dis-
tinct from genocide considering that the media use these terms inter-
changeably.2  Currently, no formal legal definition of ethnic cleansing 
exists.3  In characterizing the acts of the Yugoslav war, however, the 
United Nations Security Council’s Commission of Experts on violations 
of humanitarian law stated that “‘ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an 
area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove 
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 1. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice, in 41 
INT’L STUD. IN HUM. RTS. 1, 108 (1995) (quoting Fearful Name from a Nazi Past, L.A. TIMES, June 
22, 1994, at B6) (emphasis added). 
 2. See, e.g., Andy Segal, ‘Bombs for Peace’ After Slaughter in Bosnia, CNN, Dec. 4, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/11/20/sbm.bosnia.holbrooke/ (“Three years later, [Ri-
chard Holbrooke] would become one of the most influential U.S. figures working to end a war that 
had introduced a new euphemism for genocide: ethnic cleansing.”); Steven R. Weisman, Powell 
Declares Genocide in Sudan in Bid to Raise Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/international/africa/09CND-SUDA.html?scp=1&sq=Powell% 
20Declares%20Genocide%20in%20Sudan%20in%20Bid%20to%20Raise%20Pressure,&st=cse 
(quoting former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who, in describing the atrocities occurring in 
western Sudan, said “‘Call it civil war.  Call it ethnic cleansing.  Call it genocide.  Call it ‘none of 
the above.’  The reality is the same.’”). 
 3. Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), May 6, 2004, at 1, 39 [hereinafter 
Darfur Destroyed]. 
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persons of given groups from the area.”4  Consequently, various U.N. 
resolutions and reports, international criminal courts and tribunals, inter-
national organizations, and legal scholars have defined ethnic cleansing 
as the forcible removal, displacement, deportation, and expulsion of an 
ethnic group from a given territory.5  The forcible displacement of a par-
ticular group does not fall within the crime of genocide.6  The Genocide 
Convention defines genocide as 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) 
killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical de-
struction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring child-
ren of the group to another group.7 
                                                 
 4. Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, ¶ 55, Annex No. 1, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 9, 1993) [hereinafter Secretary-
General Letter]. 
 5. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 91st plen. mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18, 
1992) (declaring that a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations, mass expulsions of de-
fenseless civilians from their homes, and the existence of concentration camps and detention centers 
were carried out in pursuit of an “abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ which is a form of geno-
cide”); Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its First Special 
Session, at 2, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/8 (Aug. 
14, 1992) (claiming that, at a minimum, ethnic cleansing entails “deportations and forcible mass 
removal or expulsion of persons from their homes” and is “aimed at the dislocation or destruction of 
national, ethnic, racial or religious groups”); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 143 (Mar. 4, 2009); Prosecutor 
v. Simić, Tadić, & Zarić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶ 133 (Oct. 17, 2003); Drazen Pretrovic, 
Ethnic Cleansing—An Attempt at Methodology, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 342, 351–52 (1994) (“Ethnic 
cleansing is a well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another 
group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin.”); Human Rights 
Watch World Report 1994: Events of 1993, HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. (Human Rights Watch, New 
York, N.Y.), 1994, at 201, (defining the practice of ethnic cleansing as “[t]he forcible deportation and 
displacement, execution, confinement in detention camps or ghettos, and the use of siege of warfare, 
to force the flight of the ‘enemy’ ethnic population”). 
 6. The crime of genocide was first codified under the Genocide Convention.  Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].  To date, 140 states have rati-
fied the Genocide Convention, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) have adopted its provisions.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, opened 
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, ¶ 2, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 4, § 2, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1203 [hereinafter 
ICTY Statute]. 
 7. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II. 
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While ethnic cleansing could be construed as one of the foregoing 
genocidal acts,8 it is typically understood to be a separate offense—a 
crime against humanity.9 
The crime of genocide also excludes a policy of ethnic cleansing.  
Genocide is a specific intent crime; thus, to be held liable, the accused 
must possess the general intent to commit the act as well as the specific 
intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or reli-
gious group, as such.”10  Because the crime of genocide requires the spe-
cific intent to destroy, international tribunals and legal scholars consider 
displacing an ethnic group to achieve an ethnically homogenous territory 
incompatible with genocidal intent.11  By interpreting an intention to de-
stroy as distinct from an intention to displace, international tribunals 
have lost sight of the principal evil that the crime of genocide is meant to 
prevent and punish—denying a particular group of people the right to 
exist.12 
Although the legal similarities between genocide and ethnic clean-
sing have received some discussion from the International Criminal 
Court (ICC),13 international tribunals,14 and various commentators,15 an 
                                                 
 8. For example, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s 
physical destruction, imposing measures to prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring 
children could be construed as genocidal acts.  See, e.g., Pretrovic, supra note 5, at 356–57 (stating 
that certain methods of ethnic cleansing, such as torture, rape, and destruction of cultural and reli-
gious monuments, may fall within the genocidal acts of causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of a group and of deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction). 
 9. International courts and tribunals typically criminalize ethnic cleansing under the crime of 
persecution or the crime of deportation or forcible transfer, which are both crimes against humanity.  
See Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 143; Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ¶ 133. 
 10. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 2; ICTY Statute, 
supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 2; Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II. 
 11. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 977–78 (Sept. 1, 
2004) (holding that a plan intended solely to displace a population is insufficient to establish geno-
cidal intent); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 
234 (Cambridge Univ. Press) (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW] (“The issue is one of intent and it is logically inconceivable that the two agendas [of ethnic 
cleansing and genocide] coexist.”). 
 12. G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89, (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of existence 
of entire human groups.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 145 (holding that the practice of ethnic 
cleansing may result in genocide if it brings about the commission of the objective elements of ge-
nocide with the specific intent to destroy). 
 14. See, e.g., Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 981 (holding “there are obvious similarities 
between genocidal policy and the policy known as ethnic cleansing.  The underlying criminal acts 
for each may often be the same.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 31 (Apr. 
19, 2004). 
 15. See, e.g., Damir Mirković, Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Reflections on Ethnic Cleansing 
in the Former Yugoslavia, 548 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 191, 197 (1996) (“[I]n its 
broader meaning, [ethnic cleansing] implies differential treatment and discrimination with a view to 
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elaborate discussion of (1) the legal consequences of preserving a dis-
tinction versus incorporating the two acts; (2) the persuasiveness of 
states’ reasons for refusing to include ethnic cleansing within the Geno-
cide Convention; or (3) how to incorporate ethnic cleansing into the Ge-
nocide Convention is still lacking. 
This Comment specifies how ethnic cleansing fits into genocide’s 
distinctly destructive purpose and effect.  I argue that because ethnic 
cleansing and genocide result in similar harms and derive from similar 
agendas, international courts ought to find perpetrators guilty of the 
crime of genocide when genocidal acts are committed with the intent to 
create an ethnically homogenous territory.  A policy of ethnic cleansing 
is a genocidal policy. 
Part II of this Comment reviews the legislative history of the Geno-
cide Convention to provide a justification for preserving the heightened 
legal and political status currently attributed to the crime of genocide.  
Part III summarizes recent international courts’ interpretations of de-
struction as it applies to genocidal acts and genocidal intent, particularly 
their refusal to incorporate cultural destruction within their understanding 
of genocidal intent.  By excluding cultural destruction from the crime of 
genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the 
ICC have demonstrated that they are averse to equating a policy of ethnic 
cleansing with the intent to destroy.  Part IV argues that the aim of geno-
cide—the intent to destroy a human group—actually parallels a policy of 
ethnic cleansing.  Intending to expel a certain ethnic group to achieve an 
ethnically homogenous territory is an intention to destroy that ethnic 
group.  Part V explains how already developed limits on genocidal intent 
may be used to interpret a policy of ethnic cleansing as the intent to de-
stroy. 
                                                                                                             
putting on pressure to comply, to emigrate, to give up and to assimilate, and in its narrower or re-
strictive meaning, it denotes destruction, which through acts of terrorism, forceful relocation, and 
expulsion, leads ultimately to genocide.”); Pretrovic, supra note 5, at 356 (claiming that some me-
thods of ethnic cleansing fall within the parameters of genocidal acts); John Webb, Genocide Trea-
ty—Ethnic Cleansing—Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide 
Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 377, 402 
(1993) (acts of ethnic cleansing are intended to destroy the victimized group in whole or in part and 
therefore are acts of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide Convention); Linnea 
D. Manashaw, Comment, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why the Distinction?  A Discussion in 
the Context of Atrocities Occurring in Sudan, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 303, 329 (2005) (in recognition 
of the similarities and differences between genocide and ethnic cleansing, a Convention on Ethnic 
Cleansing could narrowly define ethnic cleansing as either a crime against humanity or a separate 
strict international crime). 
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II.  GENOCIDE AS THE CRIME OF CRIMES 
Currently, genocide is an offense separate from crimes against hu-
manity,16 whereas ethnic cleansing is generally classified as a crime 
against humanity.17  Crimes against humanity include a long list of in-
humane acts, such as murder; extermination; enslavement; torture; perse-
cution on political, racial, and religious grounds; and deportation or forc-
ible transfer of a population.18  However, the commission of one of the 
foregoing acts is not enough.  To be held liable for a crime against hu-
manity, the act must be “committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population.”19 
In comparing crimes against humanity with the crime of genocide, 
the similarities between the crimes’ acts are apparent.20  However, there 
are three notable distinctions between the two crimes: (1) genocide per-
tains only to crimes whose victims belong to protected groups (race, eth-
nicity, nationality, or religion), while crimes against humanity may be 
committed against any civilian population; (2) genocide requires a spe-
cific intent to destroy a group because its members share a common na-
tional, racial, ethnic, or religious identity, while crimes against humanity 
do not require any specific intent; and (3) a single isolated act could 
qualify as genocide, while a single isolated act against a civilian is un-
likely to qualify as a crime against humanity because the latter must be 
committed within the context of a widespread or systematic attack.21 
The first distinction is insufficient to differentiate the two crimes 
because an ethnic group is one of the protected groups within the crime 
of genocide.  The third distinction is both uncommon and insignificant: 
although in theory a genocidal act could be completed in isolation from a 
widespread or systematic attack, history suggests that genocide is com-
monly committed as part of a state policy or shared plan.22  Furthermore, 
                                                 
 16. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 6–7; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, arts. 2–3; ICTY 
Statute, supra note 6, arts. 4–5. 
 17. See supra note 9. 
 18. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 3 (excluding 
enforced disappearance of people and the crime of apartheid); ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5 
(excluding enforced disappearance of people and the crime of apartheid). 
 19. Id. 
 20. It takes no stretch of the imagination to see how genocidal acts—killing, causing serious 
bodily or mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical de-
struction, imposing measures intended to prevent birth, and forcibly transferring children—fit into at 
least one of the acts enumerated under crimes against humanity, if not inhumane acts in general.  
E.g., RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 
235 (2009). 
 21. See id. at 210–11. 
 22. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 73 (Judgment of Feb. 26) (holding “when part 
of the group is targeted, that part must be significant enough for its destruction to have an impact on 
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because widespread or systematic attacks result in considerable suffering 
and are likely to recur, the international community is most concerned 
with mass atrocities rather than isolated acts.  Therefore, the essential 
distinction between genocide and ethnic cleansing is intent. 
Given that the distinction between crimes against humanity and ge-
nocide is narrow, several legal scholars downplay differences and even 
suggest converging the two crimes.23  To appreciate the significance of 
the distinctions and similarities, this section will provide an overview of 
the events and legislative history prompting the formation of the interna-
tional crime of genocide, the legal status attributed to genocide, and the 
unique features of genocidal intent.  Ultimately, the policy underlying 
genocidal intent justifies preserving genocide as a separate offense. 
A.  The Formation of the Crime of Genocide 
Although the systematic killing of national, racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious groups has occurred throughout world history, it was not until 1944 
that Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide.”24  Lemkin recognized 
the absence of any crime aimed to prevent and punish the murder and 
destruction of millions.25  Genocide is not just mass murder or the de-
struction of a nation; genocide is the eradication of a people.26  Conse-
quently, Lemkin proposed criminalizing genocide to account for the dis-
criminatory nature and the destructive impact of acts that are now collec-
tively known as genocide.27  Lemkin’s definition provided that, 
“‘Whoever, while participating in a conspiracy to destroy a national, ra-
cial or religious group, undertakes an attack against life, liberty or prop-
                                                                                                             
the group as a whole”); Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 51 
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 88, U.N. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 17, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.527/Add.8 (finding that crimes like genocide and other crimes against humani-
ty are “of such magnitude that they often require some type of involvement on the part of high level 
government officials or military commanders”); William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1703, 1711 (2006) [hereinafter Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur]. 
 23. See SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 239; Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity, and Darfur, supra note 22, at 1719–21 (claiming that since the adoption of the Rome 
Statute, the legal distinctions between genocide and crimes against humanity has been largely elimi-
nated). 
 24. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944).  Lemkin was born in east-
ern Poland and later became an influential lawyer, prosecutor, and university teacher.  SCHABAS, 
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 28.  By the 1930s, he was internationally 
known as a scholar in the field of international criminal law.  Id. at 28–29. 
 25. Raphael Lemkin, in Genocide, 15 AMERICAN SCHOLAR, 227, 227 (1946) [hereinafter Lem-
kin, Genocide]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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erty of members of such groups is guilty of the crime of genocide.’”28  
The underlying premise of Lemkin’s definition is that the harm is quali-
tatively different from the individual lives lost; the harm is the loss of an 
entire people.29 
The first opportunity to apply Lemkin’s definition of genocide 
arose during the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals in 1945.  
Although the war criminals were charged with genocide, they were con-
victed of war crimes and crimes against humanity.30  The reason for this 
result was that genocide was outside the International Military Tribunal’s 
(IMT) jurisdiction.31  The Charter of the IMT provided no definition, or 
even mention, of genocide.32  Moreover, the Charter required that for a 
crime to constitute a crime against humanity, it must be committed “be-
fore or during the war”—in connection with the international armed con-
flict.33 
Partly in response to the IMT’s inability to convict defendants of 
genocide or crimes against humanity committed during peacetime,34 and 
partly in response to the emerging acceptance of the term genocide,35 the 
United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 96(I) unanimously 
and without debate.36  General Assembly Resolution 96(I) established 
genocide as a crime under international law and invited U.N. member 
states to enact legislation aimed at preventing and punishing genocide,37 
which, in turn, prompted the drafting of the Genocide Convention.38 
The U.N. Secretariat’s Human Rights Division was first assigned 
the task of drafting a genocide convention.39  The Division relied on 
Lemkin and two other experts—a former judge of the IMT and a Roma-
nian law professor—as well as the U.N. Secretary-General for guid-
ance.40  Among the various issues that arose during the drafting process 
were whether and how to distinguish genocide from crimes against hu-
                                                 
 28. Id. at 230. 
 29. Id. 
 30. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 43, 47–48. 
 31. Id. at 42. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 52.  The fear was that atrocities not committed in connection with an armed conflict 
would go unpunished due to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege—no crime can be committed 
and no punishment imposed without an established law.  Id. 
 35. National military tribunals began referencing and describing genocide in their indictments, 
judgments, and oral arguments.  SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 
48–52. 
 36. Id. at 55. 
 37. G.A. Res. 96 (I), at 188–89 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 38. Genocide Convention, G.A. Res. 260 (III), pmbl., (Dec. 9, 1948). 
 39. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 60. 
 40. Id. 
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manity.41  In the end, the drafters decided to move forward with a geno-
cide convention, making genocide an international crime punishable 
“whether committed in time of peace or in time of war.”42  This provi-
sion, combined with the Genocide Convention’s exclusion of any refer-
ence to the Nuremberg judgment,43 suggests that a majority of states 
treated genocide as a crime separate from crimes against humanity. 
Although crimes against humanity were punishable only in the con-
text of war at the time the Genocide Convention was finalized in 1948, 
today, crimes against humanity are punishable during both times of war 
and times of peace.44  Despite this similarity, there remain key distinc-
tions that justify preserving genocide as a separate offense. 
B.  The Legal Import of the Crime of Genocide 
Both the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity prohibit 
the most inhumane, cruel, and violent acts known to man.  However, 
classifying an atrocity as genocide has a much greater legal and political 
effect than classifying it as a crime against humanity.  The legal signific-
ance does not lie in the severity of the sentence45 but rather in the stabili-
ty and certainty that the Genocide Convention provides.  Crimes against 
humanity are articulated only in statutes founding international criminal 
courts or tribunals and not in any multilateral treaty or agreement like the 
Genocide Convention.  The Genocide Convention and its legislative his-
tory have generated special legal duties and remedies.46  Unlike crimes 
against humanity, the crime of genocide clearly creates obligations on 
state parties to the Convention and provides state parties with civil reme-
dies not available to states victimized by crimes against humanity. 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 60–61. 
 42. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. I. 
 43. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 87–88.  States wished to 
avoid confusion between genocide and crimes and against humanity and adopted the IMT’s restric-
tive war nexus requirement.  Id. 
 44. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5, with Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, and 
ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 3.  See also SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 213–14, 231. 
 45. The Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute, the ICTR Statute, and the ICTY Statute do 
not provide any specific sentencing guidelines, leaving sentencing to the discretion of domestic or 
international courts.  See Rome Statute, supra note 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 6; ICTY Statute, 
supra note 6.  Therefore, classifying a crime as a crime against humanity or as genocide does not 
accurately predict the punishment imposed. 
 46. SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 213 (“Unlike the crimes of genocide, torture, and 
war crimes, crimes against humanity never became the subject of a comprehensive penal treaty in 
the postwar period.”). 
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1.  The Duty to Prevent 
Under the Genocide Convention, state parties have the duties to 
prevent and to punish the crime of genocide47—and the obligation not to 
commit genocide—through their organs, persons, or groups whose con-
duct is attributable to them.48  By imposing a duty to prevent, the Con-
vention permits state parties to take action against perpetrators before 
genocide becomes a reality.  In contrast, a duty to punish compels states 
to wait for the actual atrocities to occur before any action may be taken.  
Testament of the crime of genocide’s duty to prevent requirement is the 
additional responsibility imposed on those who directly or publicly incite 
genocide.49  While inciting others to commit genocide generates criminal 
responsibility, inciting others to commit crimes against humanity does 
not.50 
State parties have a duty not only to prevent genocide on their own 
but also to encourage international preventative efforts.  The Genocide 
Convention explicitly permits any contracting party to “call upon the 
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the 
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the pre-
vention and suppression of acts of genocide.”51  Although the U.N. Char-
ter already demands that effective measures be taken to prevent and re-
move threats to international peace and security,52 an article specifying 
the role of the U.N. in preventing and suppressing genocide is especially 
significant because it promotes international efforts to stop the atrocities 
from commencing or continuing.53  Thus, by specifically permitting not 
                                                 
 47. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of July 
11) (holding that each state has the obligation to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide). 
 48. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 67 (Judgment of Feb. 26). 
 49. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25, ¶ 3(e); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 3(c); ICTY 
Statute, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 3(c); Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. III. 
 50. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25, ¶ 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 6, ¶ 1; ICTY 
Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, ¶ 1. 
 51. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. VIII. 
 52. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1; see also id. art. 35, ¶ 1 (“Any Member of the United Nations may 
bring any dispute, or any situation [which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dis-
pute], to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.”). 
 53. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of 
Minorities, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985) (prepared by B. Whitaker) 
(“The value of an article specifying the role of the United Nations in the prevention and suppression 
of genocide is especially evident, because until some special agency is set up, there is no other inter-
national organization to see to the implementation of the Convention.”). 
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only the Security Council but also the U.N. to prevent genocide, the Ge-
nocide Convention provides additional authority for intervention.54 
2.  International Court of Justice Jurisdiction 
Providing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with automatic ju-
risdiction over disputes involving state parties to the Genocide Conven-
tion evidences strong state interests in preventing genocide and attaining 
appropriate redress.  Article IX of the Genocide Convention grants, upon 
the request of one the contracting parties, the ICJ jurisdiction to decide 
disputes relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the 
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a state for 
genocide.55  The ICJ has interpreted Article IX as conferring personal 
jurisdiction over any state that is a party to the Convention56 and subject 
matter jurisdiction over any state acts that fall under the Convention’s 
provisions.57  In contrast, treaties and customary international law com-
prising crimes against humanity, even if closely related to the provisions 
of the Genocide Convention, do not fall under the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ.58  Thus, a state cannot seek relief—in the form of an injunction or 
reparations—before the ICJ for the commission of a crime against hu-
manity unless both states consent to ICJ jurisdiction.59 
C.  Genocidal Intent as the Crucial Distinction 
What makes genocide distinct from crimes against humanity?  In-
ternational criminal courts and legal scholars assert that genocide’s spe-
cific intent requirement, or genocidal intent, establishes its reputation as 
                                                 
 54. Some may argue that this merely reflects a failure of the U.N. structure and function and 
that, therefore, crimes against humanity should invoke the same U.N. attention and involvement as 
genocide.  Nonetheless, genocide continues to receive this special status, which is not shared by 
crimes against humanity. 
 55. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. IX. 
 56. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 610, (Preliminary Objections Judgment of July 
11) (holding that Yugoslavia is bound by the provisions of the Genocide Convention because it was 
party to the Convention at the time it filed the Application). 
 57. Id. at 614 (to determine whether the ICJ has jurisdiction, it must verify that the dispute 
between the parties falls within the scope of that provision). 
 58. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 341, (Judgment of Sept. 13) (the customary and 
conventional international laws of war and international humanitarian law—including but not li-
mited to the four Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations on Land and Warfare of 1907, and the 
Nuremberg Charter, Judgment, and Principles—do not establish prima facie jurisdiction because the 
texts do not confer jurisdiction upon the ICJ). 
 59. U.N. Charter app. art. 34, ¶ 1 (Statute of the International Court of Justice). 
2010] Expanding the Crime of Genocide 499 
the “crime of crimes.”60  Unlike genocide, crimes against humanity are 
not specific intent crimes; the perpetrator need intend only the prohibited 
act.  Although the ICTY and ICTR have required that the perpetrator also 
have knowledge that his or her actions were part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack, the mens rea element of crimes against humanity is still 
easier to prove than genocidal intent.61 
To be convicted of genocide, the perpetrator must not only intend to 
commit the genocidal act but also intend “to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.”62  To find genocid-
al intent, it is not enough to target a person because of his nationality, 
ethnicity, race, or religion.63  This discriminatory intent must be accom-
panied by the intent to destroy the group.64  That is, the perpetrator must 
target individuals because of their membership in a protected group and 
do so with the overall objective of destroying the group.65  Thus, the vic-
tim of genocide is the group, not the individual.66 
Although both genocide and crimes against humanity cause ex-
treme suffering and pain on a massive scale, genocide is especially evil 
because a group’s very existence is at stake.  Because of this additional 
harm, genocidal intent is the distinguishing characteristic that justifies 
                                                 
 60. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 16 (Sept. 4, 
1998) (“The crime of genocide is unique because of its element of dolus specialis (special intent) . . . 
hence the Chamber is of the opinion that genocide constitutes the crime of crimes.”); Prosecutor v. 
Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, ¶ 15 (Feb. 5, 1999).  Although the ICTR later held 
that there is no hierarchical gradation of crimes and that all crimes under the ICTR Statute constitute 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Appeals Chamber made this remark only to 
demonstrate that both genocide and crimes against humanity are capable of attracting the same sen-
tence.  Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons), ¶ 367 
(June 1, 2001).  The Appeals Chamber held that “the Trial Chamber’s description of the genocide as 
the ‘crime of crimes’ was at the level of general appreciation.”  Id.  See also Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, 
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 699 (Sept. 1, 2004) (“The intent to destroy makes genocide an 
exceptionally grave crime and distinguishes it from other serious crimes.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 134 (Apr. 19, 2004) (“Genocide is one of the worst crimes 
known to humankind, and its gravity is reflected in the stringent requirement of specific intent.”); 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, 
Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985) (prepared by B. Whitaker) (“It is the 
element of intent to destroy a designated group wholly or partially which raises crimes of mass mur-
der and against humanity to qualify as the special crime of genocide.”). 
 61. SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 218. 
 62. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 2; ICTY Statute, 
supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 2; Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II. 
 63. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88.  
See also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 20 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
 64. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 552 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor 
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
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the unqualified duties, international intervention, and universal condem-
nation resulting from the Genocide Convention.  This is not to say that 
crimes against humanity are insignificant or undeserving of punishment 
or prevention.  However, lumping the crimes together will weaken the 
stigma attached to the crime of genocide and will make universal coop-
eration more difficult.  Therefore, the crime of genocide should remain 
the “crime of crimes” with little room for expansion. 
III.  THE MEANING OF “DESTROY”: THE EXCLUSION OF CULTURAL 
DESTRUCTION FROM THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 
The Genocide Convention’s legislative history and judicial inter-
pretations of the crime of genocide define “destroy” as physical or bio-
logical destruction, deliberately leaving out cultural destruction.  When 
international courts discuss acts of ethnic cleansing, they typically refer 
to the forcible removal of a population.  Acts of forcibly removing a 
population can be used as evidence of physical or biological destruction 
in support of establishing genocide.  However, because they classify 
forcible removals as cultural destruction, international courts will not 
interpret a policy of ethnic cleansing as a genocidal policy.  The premise 
behind the courts’ reasoning is that intent to displace is not intent to de-
stroy.  This Part begins with an introduction to what ethnic cleansing is 
and how the U.N. and international courts and tribunals have defined 
destruction.  This Part ends with a discussion of how international courts 
and tribunals interpret ethnic cleansing—first as an act and then as a pol-
icy—as distinct from destruction. 
A. What is Ethnic Cleansing? 
To understand judicial decisions interpreting ethnic cleansing, one 
must understand what ethnic cleansing is.  International courts and tri-
bunals most frequently define ethnic cleansing as rendering an area eth-
nically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of 
given groups from the area.67  Yet, it is still not a formal crime of its 
own.68  Thus, international courts and tribunals commonly criminalize 
ethnic cleansing under the crime of deportation or forcible transfer or the 
crime of persecution—both crimes against humanity.69 
                                                 
 67. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecu-
tor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 143 (Mar. 4, 2009); Secretary-General Letter, supra note 
4, at ¶ 55. 
 68. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 71 (Judgment of Feb. 26). 
 69. See, e.g., Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 143; Prosecutor v. Simić, Tadić, & 
Zarić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶ 133 (Oct. 17, 2003). 
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International courts and tribunals have punished perpetrators of 
ethnic cleansing by prosecuting them for the crime of deportation or 
forcible transfer.70  Deportation and forcible transfer relate to the unlaw-
ful displacement, expulsion, relocation, or removal of persons from the 
territory in which they reside.71  Thus, ethnic cleansing describes both 
transfers outside a state as well as transfers within a state.72  What mat-
ters is not the destination but rather the forced character of the displace-
ment.73  However, forcible transfer is not restricted to physical force; it 
may include the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of 
violence, duress, detention, or psychological oppression.74  Because re-
moval may be accomplished by threats or fear of violence, ethnic clean-
sing includes means such as murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of 
civilian population in ghetto areas, deliberate military attacks or threats 
of attacks, and wanton destruction of property.75  Therefore, ethnic clean-
sing may be achieved by physically transferring an ethnic group from a 
territory and by threatening or coercing removal through violent acts.  In 
addition, the crime of deportation or forcible transfer requires that the 
perpetrator unlawfully displace a person with the intent to permanently 
displace that person.76  Although the displacement does not in fact need 
to be permanent, the perpetrator must still intend that the victim not re-
turn.77 
Ethnic cleansing is also criminalized as persecution.78  Persecution 
is “the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamen-
tal right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the 
same level of gravity” as the other acts that constitute crimes against hu-
                                                 
 70. See, e.g., Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ¶ 133. 
 71. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ¶¶ 121–24. 
 72. Id. ¶ 122. 
 73. Id. ¶ 125. 
 74. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Commission 
for the International Criminal Court, 11 n.12, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000). 
 75. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 4, ¶ 56.  See also The Secretary-General, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 9, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assem-
bly, U.N. Doc. S/24809, A/47/666 (Nov. 17, 1992) (prepared by Tadeusz Mazowiecki) [hereinafter 
Third Mazowiecki Report of 1992]. 
 76. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, Cases No. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, Review of 
the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 62 (July 11, 1996) 
(citing expert witness Professor Garde, who testified that “‘ethnic cleansing is a practice which 
means that you act in such a way that in a given territory the members of a given ethnic group are 
eliminated, aiming that a given territory be ‘ethnically pure’, in other words, that that territory would 
contain only members of the ethnic group that took the initiative of cleansing the territory’”). 
 77. Prosecutor v. Simić, Tadić, & Zarić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 133–34 (Oct. 17, 
2003).  The duration of the displacement has no impact on its legality.  Id. ¶ 134. 
 78. Prosecutor v. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 606–07 (Jan. 14, 2000). 
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manity.79  No exhaustive or complete list of persecutory acts exists.  Ra-
ther, persecution consists of a variety of inhumane acts,80 including kill-
ing, detention, deportation, expulsion, destruction of homes and property, 
and passing and implementing discriminatory laws.81  Because persecu-
tion comprises other crimes against humanity, persecution’s distinct ele-
ment is the discriminatory basis for the act:82 the intent to attack any 
identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, gender, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law.83  Although perpetrators of ethnic cleansing are prose-
cuted for crimes that entail the use of violent force and discriminatory 
intent, destruction is an exclusively genocidal element. 
B. The Meaning of Destroy 
Both the drafters of the Genocide Convention and the international 
criminal tribunals have interpreted the term destroy to exclude cultural 
genocide, which, in turn, bars ethnic cleansing from the crime of geno-
cide.  Despite Lemkin and the initial drafters’ efforts to include cultural 
genocide, states found reasons for keeping it out. 
In drafting the Genocide Convention, the drafters considered three 
different types of genocide: physical, biological, and cultural.  Physical 
genocide “involves acts intended to ‘cause the death of members of a 
group, or injuring their health or physical integrity.’”84  For example, 
physical genocide includes: massacres and executions; subjection to con-
ditions of life that are likely to result in the debilitation or death of the 
individuals (“slow death”);85 mutilation and biological experiments im-
posed with no curative purpose; deprivation of all means of livelihood by 
confiscation of property, looting, curtailment of work; and denial of 
housing and of supplies otherwise available to the other inhabitants of 
the territory concerned.86  Biological genocide is characterized by meas-
ures aimed at the extinction of a group of human beings by systematic 
                                                 
 79. Id. ¶ 621. 
 80. Id. ¶ 623. 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 610–12, 628–31. 
 82. Id. ¶ 636. 
 83. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, paras. 1(h), 2(g).  See also ICTR Statute, supra note 6, 
art. 3, para. (h) (prohibiting “persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds”); ICTY Statute, 
supra note 6, art. 5, para. (h) (prohibiting “persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds”). 
 84. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 25, delivered to the 
Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/447 (June 26, 1947) [hereinafter The Secretary-General, 
Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide]. 
 85. Examples include the lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, and 
excessive work or physical exertion.  Id. 
 86. Id. at 24–25. 
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restrictions on births without which the group cannot survive.87  For ex-
ample, biological genocide includes: sterilization, compulsory abortion; 
segregation of the sexes; and obstacles to marriage.88  Cultural genocide 
consists of “the destruction by brutal means of the specific characteristics 
of a group.”89  For example, cultural genocide includes: forced transfer of 
children to another group; forced and systematic exile of individuals 
representing the culture of a group; prohibition of the use of the national 
language in private intercourse; systematic destruction of books printed 
in the national language, or of religious works, or prohibition of new 
publications; systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments 
or their diversion to alien uses; and destruction or dispersion of docu-
ments and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value.90 
There was little debate as to the inclusion in the Genocide Conven-
tion of physical and biological genocide.91  However, the three experts 
appointed to assist in the initial drafting of the Genocide Convention, one 
of whom was Lemkin, debated the inclusion of cultural genocide.92  In 
support of including cultural genocide, Lemkin argued that the destruc-
tion of the diversity of cultures is as disastrous as the physical destruction 
of nations.93  For Lemkin, cultural genocide was more than just a policy 
of forced assimilation by moderate coercion; it was “a policy which by 
drastic methods, aimed at the rapid and complete disappearance of the 
cultural, moral and religious life of a group of human beings.”94  The 
other two experts, on the other hand, argued that cultural genocide con-
stituted the protection of minorities, which overextends the scope of ge-
nocide.95  However, Lemkin’s arguments proved successful.  The draft 
convention that the U.N. Secretary-General submitted to the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1947 included cultural genocide,96 as 
                                                 
 87. Id. at 26. 
 88. Id. 
 89. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 26. 
 90. Id. at 27–28. 
 91. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 74–75. 
 92. Id. at 61. 
 93. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 27. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 26–28 for the Secretary-General’s draft convention’s cultural genocide provi-
sions.  Note, however, that the Secretary-General’s draft convention does not include forced assimi-
lation or mass displacement as a genocidal act.  Id. at 24.  The drafters excluded forced assimilation 
because it was considered part of a policy aimed at protecting minorities, which was beyond the 
scope of genocide.  Id.  The drafters also excluded mass displacement unless it led to slow death of 
the whole or part of the group.  Id. 
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did the Ad Hoc Committee97 draft convention submitted to the Commis-
sion on Human Rights in 1948.98  It was not until the General Assembly 
weighed in that cultural genocide was excluded from the Convention. 
The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly debated the inclu-
sion of cultural genocide but ultimately decided—by 25 votes to 16, with 
4 abstentions and 13 delegations absent—to exclude provisions relating 
to cultural genocide from its final draft.99  State representatives presented 
various arguments for excluding cultural genocide: human rights law is 
better suited to protect against cultural genocide than international crimi-
nal law; there are legitimate and justifiable reasons for a state to assimi-
late or amalgamate minorities and indigenous inhabitants; acts of cultural 
genocide, such as closing down a library or destroying a school, are not 
proportionally serious or violent; and the definition of cultural genocide 
proffered was too vague and broad.100 
Since then, the International Law Commission (ILC) has affirmed 
that genocide is “the destruction of a group either by physical or biologi-
cal means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, cultural or other 
identity of a particular group,”101 and international courts and tribunals 
have interpreted destruction as purely physical and biological, excluding 
cultural destruction.102 
                                                 
 97. The ECOSOC put together the Ad Hoc Committee, which was comprised of seven state 
representatives from China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Ve-
nezuela.  SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 69–70. 
 98. Id. at 75.  The Ad Hoc Committee’s draft cultural genocide provision, which was adopted 
five votes to two, stated: 
[G]enocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the lan-
guage, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of national or 
racial origin or religious belief such as: 
(1) prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in 
schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the 
group; 
(2) destroying, or preventing the use of, libraries, museums, schools, historical 
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the 
group. 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Genocide, 17, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc E/794 (May 24, 1948). 
 99. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg. at 206, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.83 (Oct. 25, 1948). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 
90–91. 
 102. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 124 (Judgment of Feb. 26); Prosecutor v. 
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 25 (Apr. 19, 2004) (relying on the ILC report in holding 
that the Genocide Convention and customary international law prohibit only the physical or biologi-
cal destruction of a human group); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ¶ 
315 (May 15, 2003) (the meaning of “destroy” encompasses only acts that amount to physical or 
biological genocide). 
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C.  Ethnic Cleansing as a Genocidal Act? 
The ICTY uses the term destruction to establish both the actus reus 
and the mens rea elements of the crime of genocide.  In other words, the 
perpetrator must not only intend to destroy a particular group, but he or 
she must also contribute to the destruction of that particular group 
through his or her actions.103  This section discusses the interpretation of 
destruction as a genocidal act, while the following section will discuss 
the interpretation of destruction as genocidal intent.  In determining ge-
nocide’s actus reus, the ICTY has held that the forcible removal of an 
ethnic group is not itself a genocidal act but may be a condition calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction. 
On one hand, the ICTY precludes the forcible removal of an ethnic 
group from the actus reus element of the crime of genocide, limiting its 
use to proof of genocidal intent.104  The ICTY has made a conscious ef-
fort to exclude the forcible transfer, displacement, expulsion, and depor-
tation of an ethnic group from constituting genocidal acts.105  Instead, 
forcible removal is prosecuted as either persecution or the forcible trans-
fer of a population.106 
On the other hand, when the forcible removal of an ethnic group 
constructively causes physical destruction, it may constitute a genocidal 
act, specifically, a condition of life calculated to bring about a group’s 
physical destruction.107  A condition calculated to bring about such phys-
ical destruction is construed as “the methods of destruction by which the 
perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but 
which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”108  Examples of such 
conditions include systematic expulsion from homes109 or the creation of 
                                                 
 103. See, e.g., Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 9. 
 104. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006) 
(evidence of deliberate forcible transfer may be relied on as evidence of the mens rea of genocide); 
Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 975 (Sept. 1, 2004) (“whilst forcible 
displacement does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act, it does not preclude a Trial Chamber 
from relying on it as evidence of intent”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 
33 (Apr. 19, 2004) (“The fact that the forcible transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal 
act does not preclude a Trial Chamber from relying on it as evidence of the intentions of [the ac-
cused persons].”). 
 105. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 519 (July 31, 2003) (“It 
does not suffice to deport a group or a part of a group.  A clear distinction must be drawn between 
physical destruction and mere dissolution of a group.  The expulsion of a group or part of a group 
does not in itself suffice for genocide.”). 
 106. See supra note 9. 
 107. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II, ¶ (c). 
 108. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 505 (Sept. 2, 1998).  See 
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, ¶ 517. 
 109. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 691; Stakić, Case No. IT 97-24-T, ¶ 517; Prosecutor v. 
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 52 (Dec. 6, 1999). 
506 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:2 
circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as the lack of proper 
housing, clothing, hygiene, and excessive work or physical exertion.110  
Physical destruction is inevitable when people are driven from their 
homes and forced to travel long distances in a country where they are 
exposed to starvation, thirst, heat, cold, and epidemics.111  Both the ICJ 
and the ILC have supported this interpretation.112  Therefore, ethnic 
cleansing qualifies as a genocidal act when the process of forcibly re-
moving a population causes physical destruction. 
Thus, international courts and tribunals permit evidence of ethnic 
cleansing in finding a condition calculated to bring about a group’s phys-
ical destruction but preclude ethnic cleansing from constituting a geno-
cidal act in and of itself.  But even when forcible removals ultimately 
lead to the physical destruction of an ethnic group, ethnic cleansing is not 
genocide without a showing of genocidal intent. 
D.  A Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Does Not Constitute Genocidal Intent 
Just as acts of ethnic cleansing may be used as support for, but do 
not constitute genocidal acts, a policy of ethnic cleansing may be used as 
evidence of, but does not itself constitute, genocidal intent.  That is, the 
act of forcibly displacing a population may amount to genocide if it is in 
furtherance of a genocidal policy.  But a policy of ethnic cleansing does 
not establish genocidal intent, even if the implementation of such a poli-
cy entails genocidal acts that cause physical or biological destruction.  
According to the ICTY and the ICJ, the basis for classifying ethnic 
cleansing separately from genocide is simple: a policy of ethnic clean-
sing is not the same as the intent to destroy.  The cases below illustrate 
how the courts make such a distinction. 
First, the act of forcibly displacing a population may be used to in-
fer genocidal intent, but does not itself establish genocidal intent.113  For 
                                                 
 110. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 691; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. 
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 115–16 (May 21, 1999); Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, ¶ 517; Rutagan-
da, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 52. 
 111. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 24. 
 112. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 
90–92 (claiming that deportation is a condition of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical 
destruction if carried out with genocidal intent); Application of Convention on Prevention and Pu-
nishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 71 (Judgment 
of Feb. 26) (holding acts of ethnic cleansing that may be characterized as a condition of life calcu-
lated to bring about a group’s physical destruction constitute genocide if carried out with genocidal 
intent). 
 113. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 71 (acts of ethnic cleansing “may be 
significant as indicative of the presence of a specific intent inspiring [genocidal] acts”); Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 123 (May 9, 2007) (holding that forcible 
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example, in Krstić, the ICTY trial chamber convicted the accused of ge-
nocide, using forcible displacement to support a finding of genocidal in-
tent.  The trial chamber held that the accused had the requisite genocidal 
intent because he sought to eliminate all of the Bosnian Muslims in Sre-
brenica as a community.114  By killing all military-aged men and forcibly 
transferring women, children, and the elderly, the Bosnian Serb forces 
effectively destroyed the community of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebre-
nica and eliminated all likelihood that the community could ever reestab-
lish itself on that territory.115  On appeal, the accused claimed that the 
trial chamber impermissibly broadened the definition of genocide by us-
ing displacement as evidence of destruction.116  However, the appeals 
chamber affirmed the trial chamber’s decision because evidence of the 
forcible transfer of women was used in support of the trial chamber’s 
finding of intent to physically destroy.117  Given the patriarchal character 
of the Bosnian Muslim population, killing the men and removing the 
women “had severe procreative implications for the Srebrenica Muslim 
community, potentially consigning the community to extinction.”118  
Thus, the accused was found to have intended to destroy the Bosnian 
Muslim population because he must have known that the displacement of 
the women would contribute to the physical destruction of the Bosnian 
Muslim population;119 the long-term impact on the group’s survival was 
inevitable.120  The chambers made a point to use the act of forcible trans-
fer in conjunction with mass killings to establish only the intent to physi-
cally destroy the group. 
The appeals chamber also interpreted the Bosnian Serb forces’ de-
cision to transfer, rather than kill, Muslim women and children as evi-
dence of genocidal intent because the forcible transfer was “an additional 
means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the Bosnian Mus-
lim community in Srebrenica” meant to eliminate even the residual pos-
sibility that the Muslim community could reconstitute itself.121  At the 
time that the Bosnian Serb forces decided to transfer Muslim women and 
                                                                                                             
transfers and separations are relevant considerations in inferring genocidal intent but do not them-
selves suffice to demonstrate the intent to destroy). 
 114. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 594 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
 115. Id. ¶¶ 594–99.  See also Prosecutor v. Blogojević & Jović, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 666 (Jan. 17, 2005) (the Trial Chamber found that physical or biological destruction was the 
likely outcome of a forcible transfer if the group could no longer reconstitute itself—particularly 
when it involves the separation of its members). 
 116. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 24 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
 117. Id. ¶ 29. 
 118. Id. ¶ 28. 
 119. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 595. 
 120. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 28. 
 121. Id. ¶ 31. 
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children, Srebrenica had attracted international attention and U.N. troops 
occupied nearby territories.122  Thus, the forcible transfer was the best 
method, under the circumstances, for implementing the genocidal design 
because it minimized the risk of retribution.123  Because the forcible 
transfer of a community was interpreted as an additional, lesser means of 
implementing the genocidal policy, it is unlikely that it alone, unaccom-
panied by killings, would be enough to prove genocidal intent. 
Second, perpetrators who fail to employ physically destructive 
means available to them do not intend to destroy.  In Brđjanin, the ICTY 
declined to hold the accused, a leading political figure amongst the Bos-
nian Serbs in the Bosnian Krajina region, criminally responsible for the 
crime of genocide because he lacked genocidal intent.124  The trial cham-
ber found that the policy of deportation and forcible transfer targeted 
specifically at the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities was 
implemented through armed force, expulsion, intimidation, the imposi-
tion of intolerable living conditions, and the establishment of punitive 
departure conditions.125  Although the trial chamber acknowledged the 
similarities between the acts and policies of genocide and ethnic clean-
sing,126 it distinguished a policy of ethnic cleansing from a genocidal pol-
icy; the ethnic cleansing policy aimed to achieve an ethnically homogen-
ous state by permanently removing non-Serbs through the use of force 
and fear, not by destroying Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat 
groups.127  The trial chamber reasoned that, because the Serb forces were 
capable of mustering the logistical resources (guns, ammunition, etc.) to 
forcibly displace tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats, the accused could have employed the same resources to destroy 
them if such had been his intent.128  Ultimately, the trial chamber found 
that the accused lacked genocidal intent129 because using force and fear 
to displace a population is not indicative of the intent to destroy when 
enough weapons are available to kill off the population.  In other words, 
because a policy of ethnic cleansing entails less extreme means, its aim is 
not destruction. 
                                                 
 122. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. 
 123. Id. ¶ 32. 
 124. Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 989 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
 125. Id. ¶ 1027. 
 126. Id. ¶ 981 (“[T]here are obvious similarities between genocidal policy and the policy 
known as ethnic cleansing.  The underlying criminal acts for each may often be the same.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. ¶ 978.  This conclusion may conflict with the ICTY’s holding in Krstić, which held 
that “the offence of genocide does not require proof that the perpetrator chose the most efficient 
method to accomplish his objective of destroying the targeted part.”  Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. 
IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 32 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
 129. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 989. 
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Third, the intent to displace is not the intent to destroy.  In Bosnia 
& Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro, the ICJ acknowledged that acts 
of ethnic cleansing may fall within the acts listed under Article II of the 
Genocide Convention.130  However, the ICJ held that a policy of ethnic 
cleansing, defined as rendering an area ethnically homogenous, cannot 
be characterized as genocide because the forcible deportation or dis-
placement of the members of a group “is not necessarily equivalent to 
destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic conse-
quence of the displacement.”131  Although the ICJ did not elaborate on 
the precise rationale for the distinction, it relied upon the premise that 
dislocation does not necessarily destroy a group.132  Similarly, the ICC 
has held that the practice of ethnic cleansing may result in the commis-
sion of the crime of genocide when genocide’s objective elements are 
committed with the intent to destroy.133  In its decision, however, the pre-
trial chamber did not elaborate on whether a policy of ethnic cleansing 
was sufficient to establish genocidal intent. 
Through these distinctions, the ICTY, the ICJ, and the ICC have es-
tablished that a policy of ethnic cleansing, whether or not accompanied 
by genocidal acts, fails to demonstrate an intention to destroy a group.  
Their justification is simply that displacement of a group is not destruc-
tion of that group. 
IV.  ETHNIC CLEANSING IS GENOCIDE 
Problems of interpretation arise when genocidal acts are committed 
with the general intent to displace an ethnic group in addition to the spe-
cific intent to create an ethnically homogenous region.  The current in-
ternational jurisprudence on ethnic cleansing fails to thoroughly explain 
why displacement is not equivalent to destruction, and therefore, why 
ethnic cleansing is not equivalent to genocide.  While its literal interpre-
tation would suggest a distinction, destruction within the context of ge-
nocide actually suggests a similarity.  Because genocide denies human 
groups the right to exist, displacement of ethnic groups bears a strong 
resemblance to genocidal destruction.  This Part first suggests that the 
Genocide Convention’s legislative history and its final provisions prohi-
bit cultural destruction, despite the ICTY’s and the ICJ’s attempts to ex-
clude it.  Second, this Part describes how methods of ethnic cleansing 
                                                 
 130. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 71 (Judgment of Feb. 26). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Ap-
plication for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 145 (Mar. 4, 2009). 
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seclude or dismember the targeted group, which effectively destroys that 
group.  Finally, this Part identifies international courts and tribunals’ use 
of an inaccurate basis for comparison: the ICTY and the ICJ mistakenly 
regard the intent to displace as ethnic cleansing’s specific intent.  Once 
ethnic homogeneity is recognized as ethnic cleansing’s ultimate goal, it 
is easier to see how a policy of ethnic cleansing threatens the same val-
ues protected by the prohibition against genocide.  Both the practice and 
the purpose of ethnic cleansing are genocidal: forcibly transferring an 
ethnic group from a region effectively destroys the ethnic group, and de-
siring ethnic homogeneity is equivalent to denying an ethnic group the 
right to exist. 
A.  Genocide Is Cultural Destruction 
The drafters of the Genocide Convention, the ILC, and international 
courts have been fervent in their exclusion of cultural destruction from 
the crime of genocide.134  Despite these efforts, cultural destruction is a 
fundamental principle upon which the crime of genocide was originally 
formulated as well as an aspect of its current definition. 
1.  Genocide as the Inexistence of Culturally Significant Human Groups 
The crime of genocide does not protect every group’s right to exist.  
It protects only those groups that make significant cultural contributions 
that cannot be disassociated from the community in which they have 
thrived. 
Depriving society of a particular group’s social and cultural contri-
butions is the principal evil that the crime of genocide aimed to punish.135  
In formulating the crime of genocide, Lemkin and the U.N. General As-
sembly defined genocide as denying entire human groups the right of 
existence.136  Underlying the denial of a group’s right to exist is the cul-
tural loss to humanity.137  For “[i]f the diversity of cultures were de-
                                                 
 134. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 206; Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 90–91; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-
33-T, Judgment, ¶ 576 (Aug. 2, 2001); Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 124. 
 135. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 195 (“[T]he concept of geno-
cide should extend to the inclusion of acts less terrible in themselves but resulting ‘in great losses to 
humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions,’ for which it was indebted to the destroyed 
human group.”). 
 136. Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 229 (“[B]y the formulation of genocide as a crime, 
the principle that every national, racial and religious group has a natural right of existence is 
claimed.”); G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of 
entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.”). 
 137. See The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 
27 (Genocide aims “at the rapid and complete disappearance of the cultural, moral and religious life 
of a group of human beings.”); G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89 (Dec. 11, 1946) (“[D]enial of the right of 
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stroyed, it would be as disastrous for civilization as the physical destruc-
tion of nations.”138 
We can best understand this when we realize how impoverished our 
culture would be if the peoples doomed by Germany, such as the 
Jews, had not been permitted to create the Bible, or to give birth to 
an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not had the opportunity to 
give the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie; the Czechs, a Huss, 
a Dvorak; the Greeks, a Plato and a Socrates; the Russians, a Tols-
toy and a Shostakovich.139 
Because certain human groups provide important moral, intellectual, and 
spiritual contributions, the crime of genocide was principally concerned 
with protecting such groups. 
Not all groups of people enjoy the same protection under the crime 
of genocide; only permanent and stable groups140 identified by cultural 
characteristics are protected.  The Genocide Convention applies to victi-
mized national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups141 and purposely ex-
cludes groups defined by their politics, economic and social status, lan-
guage, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, and 
age.142  While national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups were accepted 
with little disagreement,143 the international courts still faced the chal-
lenge of identifying such groups. 
In determining whether a group of people constitutes one of the 
protected groups, international courts must ascertain particular characte-
                                                                                                             
existence shocks the conscience of mankind, [and] results in great losses to humanity in the form of 
cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups.”). 
 138. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 27. 
 139. Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 228. 
 140. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 511 (Sept. 2, 1998) (holding 
that genocide targets stable and permanent groups determined by birth, “with the exclusion of the 
more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as political 
and economic groups.”); U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 69th mtg. at 56–61, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.69 (Oct. 7, 
1948); The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur, ¶ 501, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Sept. 18, 
2004). 
 141. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II. 
 142. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 150–71.  During the 
drafting of the Genocide Convention, the Sixth Committee left out political and economic groups 
because nationality, race, and religion were deemed more stable and permanent and less contentious 
among state representatives.  U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 69th mtg. at 56–61, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.69 
(Oct. 7, 1948).  It was not until its 128th meeting that the Sixth Committee decided to delete political 
groups from the listed groups under article II.  U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 128th mtg. at 664, U.N. Doc 
A/C.6/SR.128 (Nov. 29, 1948). 
 143. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 69th mtg. at 56–61, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.69 (Oct. 7, 1948). 
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ristics of the group that set it apart from the rest of society.144  The cha-
racteristics relied upon tend to be cultural.145  The crime of genocide de-
fines groups by their culture—suggesting that the ultimate evil is cultural 
destruction.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss 
sociological explanations for the special protection afforded to these 
groups, one compelling argument is that the cultures of national, ethnic, 
racial, and religious groups are deeply embedded in the land.146  These 
groups are commonly defined by beliefs, customs, and connections to the 
land in which they live.147  Consequently, removing members of these 
groups from their homes not only deprives members of their basic sur-
vival needs, but it also destroys the group as a culturally significant unit. 
Contrary to the accepted justifications for excluding cultural de-
struction,148 genocide is cultural destruction not as a coincidental conse-
quence, but as an intended consequence.  Lemkin and the General As-
sembly sought to criminalize this intent to destroy when they defined 
genocide as the denial of a group’s right to exist and selected culturally 
significant human groups for protection. 
2.  The Crime of Genocide Explicitly Includes Cultural Destruction 
In addition to the implied inclusion of cultural destruction, the 
crime of genocide also explicitly includes acts categorized as cultural 
destruction.  The forcible transfer of children is a genocidal act that can-
                                                 
 144. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 521 (July 31, 2003) (“The 
group must be targeted because of characteristics peculiar to it, and the specific intent must be to 
destroy the group as a separate and distinct entity.”). 
 145. See Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 666 (Jan. 17, 
2005) (a group is considered separate and distinct based on “its history, traditions, the relationship 
between its members, the relationship with other groups, [and] the relationship with the land.”); 
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 557 (Aug. 2, 2001) (“A group’s cultural, 
religious, ethnical, or national characteristics must be identified within the socio-historic context 
which it inhabits.”); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(defining an ethnic group as a group whose members share a common language or culture and defin-
ing a religious group as one whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of wor-
ship).  But see id. ¶ 514 (holding the definition of racial group is “based on the hereditary physical 
traits often identified within a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or 
religious factors.”). 
 146. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313 
(2008) (arguing that land is essential to the identity and cultural survival of collective groups); Mar-
garet Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (arguing that individuality and 
selfhood are intertwined with property such that property cannot be replaced without pain). 
 147. See Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 137 (defining a distinct ethnic group by its 
own language, its own tribal customs, and “its own traditional links to its lands.”) (emphasis added); 
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ¶ 666 (holding that a group is considered separate and distinct 
based on “its history, traditions, the relationship between its members, the relationship with other 
groups, [and] the relationship with the land.”) (emphasis added). 
 148. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
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not be appropriately categorized as either physical or biological destruc-
tion.  The process by which the forcible transfer of children was even-
tually adopted may have caused confusion: the U.N. Secretary-General’s 
draft included the forcible transfer of children as a form of cultural geno-
cide;149 the Ad Hoc Committee’s draft included cultural genocide but 
excluded the forcible transfer of children;150 and the Sixth Committee’s 
draft excluded cultural destruction151 but included the forcible transfer of 
children.152  Thus, when the General Assembly adopted the Sixth Com-
mittee’s draft, the Genocide Convention was understood to exclude cul-
tural genocide but to retain the genocidal act of forcibly transferring 
children. 
In maintaining an interpretation consistent with the drafters’ ulti-
mate decision to exclude cultural destruction, the ILC claimed that the 
forcible transfer of children is an act of biological genocide.153  Without 
further elaboration, the ILC depicted the forcible transfer of children as 
having “particularly serious consequences for future viability of a group 
as such.”154  However, it is difficult to understand how the forcible trans-
fer of children destroys the viability of the group.  If, by viability, the 
ILC meant the biological survival of the group, then there is no destruc-
tion, for surely children of a group can procreate with one another in a 
different territory.  The destruction is cultural.155  By transferring child-
ren of a group to another territory, the children are forced to assimilate 
into a new community—a community with different practices, traditions, 
customs, and beliefs.156  Thus, uprooting children from their families and 
                                                 
 149. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 27. 
 150. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, supra note 98, at 15, 17–19. 
 151. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 206. 
 152. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 82d mtg. at 190, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.82 (Oct. 23, 1948). 
 153. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 
90–92. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Schabas conceded this point when he stated that the forcible transfer of children is 
“somewhat anomalous, because it contemplates what is in reality a form of cultural genocide . . . the 
prosecution would be required to prove the intent ‘to destroy’ the group in a cultural sense rather 
than in a physical or biological sense.” SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
11, at 294.  Similarly, in Krajiŝnik, the ICTY held that destruction is not limited to physical or bio-
logical destruction of the group’s members “since the group (or a part of it) can be destroyed in other 
ways, such as by transferring children out of the group.”  Prosecutor v. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-
39-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006). 
 156. The process of forcing children at an impressionable and receptive age to a culture and 
mentality different from their parents’ “tends to bring about the disappearance of the group as a 
cultural unit in a relatively short time.”  The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of 
Genocide, supra note 84, at 27.  In arguing for the inclusion of cultural genocide, the delegate from 
Venezuela reminded the other Sixth Committee members that the forcible transfer of children was 
adopted because the children of a group will be transferred to a place “where they would be given an 
education different from that of their own group, and would have new customs, a new religion and 
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communities, in effect, precludes children from learning and identifying 
with their ethnic heritage.  The harm is the disappearance of an ethnicity. 
While the ICTY, the ICJ, and the ILC have followed the drafters’ 
intent in interpreting the Genocide Convention to exclude cultural de-
struction,157 the inclusion of the act of forcibly transferring children with-
in the final draft and subsequent international court and tribunal sta-
tutes158 perpetuates the ambiguous relationship between cultural destruc-
tion and genocide.  Given the confusion regarding cultural destruction, 
inclusion of ethnic cleansing within the crime of genocide may actually 
be consistent with the aims and purposes of the crime of genocide. 
B.  Forcible Displacement Is a Method of Permanent Destruction 
To determine whether a policy of ethnic cleansing intends to de-
stroy, ethnic cleansing must constitute destruction.  Several commenta-
tors and the ICTY distinguish between ethnic cleansing and genocide 
based on genocide’s irreversible destruction.159  They argue that the eth-
nic group, once removed, still exists, while a group, once exterminated, 
does not.160  However, history suggests otherwise: displacing a group 
permanently destroys it.  There are two means by which displacement 
leads to destruction: seclusion and dismemberment. 
Even if the members of an ethnic group survive, secluding an ethnic 
group so that it can no longer participate in society effectively destroys 
the group.  Although, in practice, ethnic cleansing has been confined to 
only one or a few territories,161 it is easy to realize the devastating conse-
quences that a policy of ethnic cleansing has when shared by many 
                                                                                                             
probably a new language.”  U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99.  The forcible transfer of 
children is “tantamount to the destruction of their group, whose future depended on that generation 
of children.”  Id. 
 157. See supra Part III.B. 
 158. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6, ¶ (e); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 2(e); 
ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 2(e); Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II, ¶ (e). 
 159. E.g., Paul Behrens, A Moment of Kindness?  Consistency and Genocidal Intent, in THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE, 125, 133 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007). 
 160. See, e.g., SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234 (“ethnic 
cleansing tolerates the existence of the group elsewhere whereas genocide may not”); Behrens, supra 
note 159, at 133 (“‘Destruction’ carries a distinct notion of permanence which does not inhabit the 
concept of ‘expulsion’: the group still exists, and it cannot even be said with certainty that it will 
never again re-form on its accustomed territory.”). 
 161. For example, during the Nazi Holocaust, victimized groups were cleansed from Germany, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia; during the Yugoslav war, Serb forces cleansed Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na of Muslims and Croats; and in Darfur, the Sudanese government and militia aim to cleanse Darfur 
of certain African tribal groups.  See Part V for a more detailed discussion of the geographic limita-
tions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
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states.162  If a particular ethnic group is purged from every territory in 
which it resides or seeks refuge, what is to become of the group?  A 
group that is completely isolated from the rest of society can no longer 
interact with or contribute to the outside world.  Consequently, an ethnic 
group’s physical existence becomes meaningless because its social val-
ue—its culture, language, customs, scriptures, etc.—ceases to exist. 
A second method by which an ethnic group may be destroyed is 
dismemberment.  Displacing an ethnic group effectively dismembers the 
group by severing the bonds between members.  In several decisions, the 
ICTY has acknowledged the cultural destruction that often accompanies 
the removal of entire human groups from a given region.163  For example, 
in Krajiŝnik, the trial chamber held that destruction is not limited to 
physical or biological destruction because a group can be destroyed by 
severing the bonds among its members.164  The chamber claimed, “[i]t is 
not accurate to speak of ‘the group’ as being amenable to physical or bio-
logical destruction” because the bonds among group members as well as 
the group’s culture and beliefs are neither physical nor biological.165  Si-
milarly, in Blagojević, the trial chamber held that physical destruction 
included dismemberment of the group by means of forcible transfer.166  
The chamber reasoned that the group ceases to exist as a group when the 
forcible transfer of group members prevents the group from reconstitut-
ing itself.167  Although these decisions were not applied or upheld,168 they 
                                                 
 162. Although it is easier to comprehend the large-scale effects of seclusion, the small-scale 
effects are the same.  When only one or a few states share a policy of ethnic cleansing, secluding an 
ethnic group from the rest of society has the same destructive effect: deprivation of the moral and 
social value that that group has to offer. 
 163. See Prosecutor v. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006); 
Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 666 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor 
v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 574 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, 
Cases No. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R-61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, ¶ 94 (July 11, 
1996). 
 164. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ¶ 854. 
 165. Id. ¶ 854 n.1701.  See also Krstić, in which the trial chamber held that, in addition to 
physical destruction, “one may also conceive of destroying a group through purposeful eradication 
of its culture and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an entity distinct from 
the remainder of the community.”  Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 574. 
 166. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ¶ 666.  See also Karadžić, in which the trial chamber 
notes that acts that serve to dismember the group are designed to reach the very foundations of the 
group.  Karadžić, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R-61, ¶ 94. 
 167. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ¶ 666. 
 168. In Krajiŝnik, the trial chamber did not explicitly apply a definition of destruction that 
incorporated cultural destruction.  Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ¶ 854.  Rather, the chamber held 
that the accused’s principal objective to forcibly remove Muslims and Croats from certain territories 
did not constitute genocidal intent.  Id. ¶ 1092.  In Blagojević, the appeals chamber, while acknowl-
edging that forcible transfers were relevant considerations in assessing whether the perpetrators had 
genocidal intent, overturned the trial chamber’s finding of complicity to commit genocide because 
the forcible transfer operation alone, or coupled with the murders and mistreatment in Bratunac 
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serve to demonstrate the permanent cultural loss that results from divid-
ing and disconnecting an ethnic group. 
The cultural loss experienced after severing the bonds between in-
dividual members of an ethnic group is often permanent.  During the 
Yugoslav war, Serb forces committed murder and other inhumane acts 
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to instill fear and to force 
the population to leave.169  To ensure that members of these groups 
would not return, Serb forces demolished and appropriated Bosnian Mus-
lim and Bosnian Croat property, homes, and places of worship.170  These 
and similar methods of ethnic cleansing proved successful in their goal, 
as the demography of Bosnia and Herzegovina rapidly changed.171  In 
1993, 810,000 Croats and Muslims were displaced internally and 
700,000 refugees were located in other countries.172  Those who survived 
the attacks could not return or successfully re-establish their lives: the 
homes demolished by the attacks were no longer standing; survivors 
could not contemplate going back due to the pain and fear associated 
with the attacks; Bosnian Muslim women, accustomed to the patriarchal 
society in which they lived, suddenly became the heads of households 
but could not find employment; and dismembered family units caused 
irreparable damage to children’s development.173 
Similarly, in Darfur, government forces and militias have carried 
out large-scale forcible displacement,174 destruction of villages, pillaging, 
killings, torture, rape, and other inhumane treatment against ethnically 
African groups (specifically, the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa tri-
bes, which are distinguishable from Arab tribes in the region).175  Reports 
indicate that the attacks committed against these African tribes constitute 
ethnic cleansing.176  The deliberate destruction of villages and forcible 
displacement of African tribes from the region has essentially led to the 
                                                                                                             
town, did not suffice to demonstrate intent to destroy the protected group.  Prosecutor v. Blagojević 
& Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, ¶ 123 (May 9, 2007). 
 169. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ¶ 1093. 
 170. Id. ¶ 1095. 
 171. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 20, submitted 
to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (Feb. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Mazo-
wiecki Report of 1993]. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 90–94 (Aug. 2, 2001).  See also 
Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 162–64 (Jan. 17, 2005). 
 174. As of 2007, the conflict in Darfur had generated 1.25 million internally displaced persons 
and over 200,000 refugees.  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Trends in Displace-
ment, Protection and Solutions, 2007 UNHCR STAT. Y.B. 66. 
 175. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶¶ 186, 
192–93. 
 176. Id. ¶ 194.  E.g., Darfur Destroyed, supra note 3, at 39–40. 
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permanent expulsion of these groups from their places of habitation.177  
Historical accounts suggest that the effects of the attacks are permanent: 
internally displaced persons remain afraid to return to their places of ori-
gin out of fear of renewed attacks,178 and Arab populations have settled 
in areas previously occupied by the displaced populations.179  Without 
the possibility of returning and reconstituting themselves, the displaced 
African tribes from Darfur can no longer carry on their existence as se-
dentary farmers on tribal land.180 
Forcible removals like those in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur 
demonstrate the permanent effect that ethnic cleansing has within a re-
gion.  The irreversible ethnic recomposition of a territory manifests itself 
as a form of destruction because members of an ethnic group are 
uprooted from their homes without the possibility of reestablishing the 
communal ties, traditions, or practices that once defined them. 
C.  A Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Intends to Destroy 
Even though international courts and tribunals have determined that 
acts of ethnic cleansing constitute destruction, they have excluded ethnic 
cleansing from the crime of genocide because of its distinguishable spe-
cific intent—the intent to displace.  What the courts and tribunals have 
failed to realize is that ethnic cleansing’s specific intent is not the intent 
to displace, but rather the intent to achieve ethnic homogeneity.  This 
misconception has led to the exclusion of ethnic cleansing from the 
crime of genocide.  By categorizing ethnic cleansing as persecution and 
not as genocide,181 international courts and tribunals devalue the perma-
nent destruction that ethnic cleansing causes.  Ethnic cleansing is more 
than just discriminatory.  Therefore, because ethnic cleansing is capable 
of destruction and the ethnic cleanser’s mental state is one of extreme 
intolerance, a policy of ethnic cleansing intends to destroy. 
                                                 
 177. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶ 195 (con-
cluding from observations and eyewitness accounts that militias are occupying the villages previous-
ly occupied by displaced groups, continuing to raid and attack the villages, and destroying essential 
food stocks and water sources to ensure that no one will return). 
 178. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶ 197; 
Darfur Destroyed, supra note 3, at 35. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Prior to the attacks, the African tribes consisted of settled farmers who had thrived on the 
same land for years.  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶ 
194 n.107. 
 181. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecu-
tor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 142 (Mar. 4, 2009); Application of Convention on Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 
70 (Judgment of Feb. 26); Prosecutor v. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 636 (Jan. 14, 
2000). 
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1.  Ethnic Cleansing’s Specific Intent 
To accurately compare genocide to ethnic cleansing, the elements 
of each crime must be clearly articulated.  Because genocide’s distin-
guishing feature is its specific intent, the intent to destroy must be com-
pared to a policy of ethnic cleansing.  Without a formal statute, the mens 
rea requirement of ethnic cleansing is unclear.  Genocide scholars and 
the ICTY have attempted to define ethnic cleansing’s specific intent as 
the intent to displace.  However, in doing so, they have confused ethnic 
cleansing’s specific intent with its general intent, thus making erroneous 
distinctions determinative.  A proper comparison addresses ethnic clean-
sing’s intent to create ethnically homogenous regions, not merely its in-
tent to displace. 
In his comprehensive book, Genocide in International Law, Wil-
liam A. Schabas discounts the claim that ethnic cleansing is a form of 
genocide because of the crimes’ conflicting intents.182  He argues that 
although ethnic cleansing and genocide may share the goal of eliminating 
the persecuted group from a given area, the crimes have different specific 
intents: “One is intended to displace a population, the other to destroy it.  
The issue is one of intent and it is logically inconceivable that the two 
agendas coexist.”183  While one may argue that the intent to displace is 
separate from the intent to destroy, the problem with Schabas’s claim is 
that ethnic cleansing’s specific intent is to create an ethnically homogen-
ous territory, not to displace a population. 
Unfortunately, the ICTY applies Schabas’s argument in drawing a 
distinction between ethnic cleansing’s specific intent—the intent to dis-
place—and genocide’s intent to destroy.184  By attaching the wrong spe-
cific intent to ethnic cleansing, the ICTY’s analysis is inherently flawed.  
For example, in Krstić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the ac-
cused lacked genocidal intent because his specific intent to carry out 
forcible displacement could be distinguished from the specific intent of 
other members of the Serb military who saw the forcible displacement as 
a means of advancing a genocidal plan.185  Both the accused and the oth-
                                                 
 182. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 982 n.2472 (Sept. 1, 2004) 
(citing Schabas’s Genocide in International Law to support the Chamber’s holding that a genocidal 
campaign is distinct from a campaign of massive displacement); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-
98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 33 n.53 (Apr. 19, 2004); (citing Schabas’s Genocide in International Law to 
support the Chamber’s reliance on forcible transfer only to infer, not to exclusively establish geno-
cidal intent); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 519 n.1097 (July 31, 2003) 
(citing Schabas’s Genocide in International Law to support the Chamber’s holding that expulsion of 
a group does not in itself suffice to establish genocide). 
 185. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 133. 
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er members of the Serb military intended to displace the population.  The 
accused, however, did not intend to displace as a means of destroying the 
Bosnian Muslim population.  Thus, the intent to displace an ethnic group 
is both consistent with genocidal intent (in the case of the other members 
of the Serb military) and inconsistent with genocidal intent (in the case of 
the accused).  When the general intent to displace is accompanied by the 
specific intent to destroy, the intent to destroy and the intent to displace 
coexist, contrary to Schabas’s claim.  Because the displacement of a 
group can further both a genocidal policy and a policy of ethnic clean-
sing, the intent to displace is not the proper basis for distinction. 
The proper basis for comparison is the overall objective of each 
crime, which, for ethnic cleansing, is the intent to create ethnically ho-
mogenous regions, not the intent to displace.  The displacement of a 
group can be achieved either directly or indirectly.  Where the displace-
ment of a group is achieved directly by physically removing the group—
for example, taking people from their homes and involuntarily deporting 
them outside the state or region—the actus reus is the physical removal 
of the group.186  Because the general intent of a crime requires nothing 
more than the intent to commit a particular act,187 the intent to displace is 
ethnic cleansing’s general intent.  Just as the acts enumerated in provi-
sions (a), (b), and (e) of the crime of genocide require, respectively, the 
intent to kill, the intent to cause serious bodily or mental harm, and the 
intent to forcibly transfer children,188 the act of displacing a group re-
quires the intent to displace.189  In contrast, a policy of ethnic cleansing 
entails displacing a group for the purpose of rendering an area ethnically 
homogenous.190  Creating an ethnically pure area is the end,191 while dis-
                                                 
 186. “The action taken against the individual members of the group is the means used to 
achieve the ultimate criminal objective with respect to the group.”  Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88. 
 187. A general-intent crime is one “that involves performing a particular act without intending 
a further act or a further result.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 428 (9th ed. 2009).  Cf. Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88 (holding that the crime 
of genocide, in addition to a general intent to commit the act, requires “a specific intent with respect 
to the overall consequences of the prohibited act”). 
 188. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, 
at 88 (stating that the crime of genocide requires a general intent to commit one of the prohibited 
acts enumerated in sub-paragraphs of Article II of the Genocide Convention). 
 189. See infra Part V.A for a discussion of how the general intent to displace may be incorpo-
rated into the crime of genocide. 
 190. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 4, ¶ 55 (“‘[E]thnic cleansing’ means rendering an 
area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from 
the area.”). 
 191. During the Yugoslav war, ethnic cleansing was used as a military term, meaning “to clean 
the territory” of ethnic contamination in the final phases of combat.  Pretrovic, supra note 5, at 343.  
In English and in French, reference is made to ethnic purification.  Id. 
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placing is the means.  Thus, the specific intent is not to displace but to 
ethnically cleanse. 
Where the displacement of a group is achieved indirectly—through 
coercive means such as threats of violence, destruction of homes, or con-
taminating a community’s only source of food or water—the intent to 
displace does not adequately describe the perpetrator’s specific intent.  
Displacing a group is the physical result, but it does not explain why the 
perpetrator desires to displace a certain group; it does not fully capture 
the underlying motive.192  When acts are committed in furtherance of a 
policy of ethnic cleansing, intending to create an ethnically homogenous 
region is the specific intent.  The principal evil is the establishment of 
ethnically homogenous regions, not merely as an accidental or unin-
tended consequence, but as the ultimate goal.193 
Therefore, in determining whether a policy of ethnic cleansing con-
stitutes genocidal intent, the real issue is whether the intent to create an 
ethnically homogenous territory is equivalent to the intent to destroy. 
2.  Ethnic Cleansing Is More Than Just Discriminatory 
Ethnic cleansing, like genocide, is more than just discriminatory—it 
is destructive.  International courts and tribunals continue to prosecute 
ethnic cleansing as the crime of persecution because persecution requires 
a discriminatory intent.  Persecution is broadly defined194 as the “inten-
tional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to interna-
tional law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”195  Per-
secutory acts are directed against individuals of a protected group be-
cause they belong to that group.196  While ethnic cleansing clearly falls 
within the crime of persecution because of its discriminatory nature,197 
                                                 
 192. The specific intent of a crime like genocide “is characterized by the psychological rela-
tionship between the physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator.”  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 518 (Sept. 2, 1998).  See also 22 C.J.S. Crim Law § 40 (2008) 
(“The term ‘specific intent’ is used to designate a specific mental element which is required above 
and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime.”). 
 193. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 6, submitted to 
the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10 (Oct. 27, 1992) (“[T]he principal 
objective of the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment of ethnically-
homogeneous regions.  Ethnic cleansing does not appear to be the consequence of the war but rather 
its goal.”). 
 194. Prosecutor v. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 623 (Jan. 14, 2000). 
 195. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, ¶ 2(g).  See also Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 
621. 
 196. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 636. 
 197. By virtue of targeting undesirable ethnic groups, ethnic cleansing is discriminatory.  Even 
though the label “ethnic cleansing” would suggest that groups are targeted based on negative charac-
teristics (e.g., non-German, non-Serb, or non-Arab), policies of ethnic cleansing typically identify 
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this does not justify its exclusion from the crime of genocide because 
genocide, like ethnic cleansing, is a form of persecution.198  Even though 
both persecution and genocide require the intent to discriminate, geno-
cide’s distinct intent to destroy elevates the level of culpability.199  Thus, 
if a policy of ethnic cleansing is more than just discriminatory, and also 
intends to destroy, then ethnic cleansing is more appropriately catego-
rized as a form of genocide. 
3.  A Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Intends to Destroy 
Destruction of an ethnic group is not just the probable consequence 
of implementing a policy of ethnic cleansing; it is also the desired conse-
quence.  The impermanence of forcibly removing a group is an obstacle 
for meeting not only the crime of genocide’s actus reus requirements, but 
also its mens rea requirements.  Many would agree that Hitler’s intention 
to destroy all of the Jews in Europe constituted genocidal intent.  How-
ever, Schabas argues that this was a “modest ambition,” one amounting 
to only ethnic cleansing.200  What made Hitler’s policy genocidal, ac-
cording to Schabas, was his intention to extend his murderous campaign 
to the rest of the world.201  This argument is inconsistent with the crime 
of genocide’s elements and underlying principles.  In fact, the ICTY Ap-
peals Chamber has explicitly refuted such an argument.202 
A genocidal policy is not required to stretch the entire globe.203  
Recall that genocidal intent is the intent to destroy a group “in whole or 
in part.”204  Thus, the intent to destroy may be geographically limited to a 
                                                                                                             
victims according to positive characteristics (e.g., Jews, Bosnian Muslims, or African tribes).  See, 
e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 73–74 (Judgment of Feb. 26) (holding that while a protected 
group must be identified according to particular positive characteristics, Bosnian Muslims were 
referenced according to their particular group identity). 
 198. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 636 (“[F]rom the viewpoint of mens rea, genocide is 
an extreme and most inhuman form of persecution.”). 
 199. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Ap-
plication for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 142 (Mar. 4, 2009); Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. 
at 70; Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 636. 
 200. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Even though the Nazis intended to eliminate only the Jews within Europe, and the Hutus 
did not intend to eliminate the Tutsis beyond Rwanda’s borders, the ICTY Appeals Chamber recog-
nized that both genocidal campaigns targeted a substantial part of the ethnic groups.  Prosecutor v. 
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 13 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
 203. E.g., Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 
2007 I.C.J. at 74; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 586 (Aug. 2, 2001); Re-
port of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 89. 
 204. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II. 
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region of a country or even a municipality.205  Still, the part of the group 
must be substantial so as to affect the entirety.206  In determining whether 
the part of the group is substantial, international courts and tribunals look 
to quantitative factors, such as the numeric size of the targeted group and 
the number of individuals in relation to the overall size of the group, and 
qualitative factors, such as the prominence of the targeted portion within 
the group (for example, if a specific part of a group is emblematic of the 
overall group or essential to its survival).207  Therefore, the geographic 
scope of a genocidal policy is not the deciding factor.  Rather, the inten-
tion to significantly impact the group’s continued existence is the key 
determination.208  In other words, a policy of ethnic cleansing does not 
need to have a permanent effect; it needs to intend to have a permanent 
effect. 
Even if, as Schabas proclaims, it is true that genocide is the last 
resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser,209 the goals of each crime are the 
same.  Frustrated that he is not getting the desired effect, the ethnic 
cleanser may expand or speed up his efforts, but this does not change his 
original intent.  Generating a more effective or successful policy—one 
that targets a greater number of people or that causes immediate harm—
does not transform the desire to eradicate an ethnic group.  The possibili-
ty of an ethnic group reestablishing itself elsewhere is near impossible 
once group members are removed or forced to flee.  Consequently, the 
ethnic cleanser is well aware of the subsequent whole or partial destruc-
tion of the displaced ethnic group.  It is this awareness of the permanent 
effect that warrants expansion of the crime of genocide to include ethnic 
cleansing. 
A policy of ethnic cleansing aims to permanently rid a region of an 
ethnic group to achieve ethnic homogeneity.210  The sole purpose of the 
ethnic cleanser is to achieve ethnic purity.  There is no other, legitimate 
                                                 
 205. See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 8.  See also Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 
146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74; Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-
T, Judgment, ¶ 703 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
 206. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶¶ 9–10.  See also Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, 
¶ 146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74; Report of the International Law Commis-
sion to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 89. 
 207. Krstić, Case No. IT 98-33-A, ¶ 12.  See also Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 
146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74. 
 208. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74. 
 209. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234. 
 210. See, e.g., Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶¶ 3, 10–11 (alleging that to create an ethnically 
pure Serbian state, Serb forces needed to permanently remove, or ethnically cleanse, almost all Bos-
nian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the area); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judg-
ment, ¶¶ 562–63 (Aug. 2, 2001) (claiming that Serb forces terrorized civilian populations with the 
objective of ethnically cleansing the area, or forcing their flight to ensure the region would remain 
Serbian forever). 
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or illegitimate, reason or justification,211 and the desired effect is perma-
nent.  Intending to create an ethnically pure territory conveys to members 
of the supposedly impure group, residents of the cleansed territory, and 
the international community that a particular ethnic group is unworthy of 
existence, and that this ethnic group is socially undesirable for reasons 
stemming from utter hatred and disgust.  This extreme intolerance denies 
the group the right to exist, which is precisely the evil that the crime of 
genocide was designed to prohibit.212 
In sum, a policy of ethnic cleansing aims to eliminate an entire 
people from a region213 because society—defined regionally or global-
ly—is thought better off without it.  In this way, ethnic purity poses the 
greatest threat to the peace and security of mankind,214 and therefore, 
demands the same level of mental culpability as genocide. 
V.  INTERPRETING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE TO INCLUDE ETHNIC 
CLEANSING 
This Part is intended to provide a rough sketch of how to interpret 
ethnic cleansing as genocide.  This Part discusses first how ethnic clean-
sing establishes the actus reus of the crime of genocide and second how 
a policy of ethnic cleansing can be interpreted as genocidal intent. 
                                                 
 211. Legitimate reasons for removing an ethnic minority may include: to preclude insurgence, 
to ensure the safety of innocent civilians during a time of war, or to protect fundamental rights and 
freedoms.  See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 197–203 (in discussing 
whether to include cultural genocide within the Genocide Convention, several delegates argued that 
precluding a state government from interfering with a protected group’s customs or structures could 
threaten the political and social advancement of its members and may overlook constructive efforts 
to establish a common culture); U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 82d mtg., supra note 152, at 188 (The Polish 
delegate expressed concern with adopting a provision prohibiting the transfer of children because it 
“could also be applied to the evacuation of children from a theatre of war.  Such evacuation had in 
fact been carried out by agencies working under the auspices of the United Nations.”).  Likewise, 
illegitimate but distinct reasons would not constitute the intent to ethnically cleanse.  For example, 
the U.S.’s internment of Japanese citizens was not implemented under a policy of ethnic cleansing 
because it stemmed from a belief, although unsupported, that Japanese-Americans were assisting 
enemy forces. 
 212. G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89, (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of exis-
tence of entire human groups.”); Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 229 (“[B]y the formulation of 
genocide as a crime, the principle that every national, racial and religious group has a natural right of 
existence is claimed.”). 
 213. See supra note 76; Third Mazowiecki Report of 1992, supra note 75, ¶ 9 (“The term ethnic 
cleansing refers to the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of 
members of other ethnic groups.”). 
 214. See generally Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
supra note 22; UN Charter pmbl., arts. 1–2. 
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A.  Establishing the Actus Reus of the Crime of Genocide 
For the purposes of this Comment, ethnic cleansing can be catego-
rized as forcible actual or constructive displacement of a group.  Actual 
displacement of a group occurs when people are physically taken from 
their homes and involuntarily deported outside the state or region.215  
Constructive displacement occurs when an ethnic group is displaced 
from a given area by destroying group members’ homes, threatening 
them with violence, or contaminating their only source of food or water. 
One can easily construe acts involving either the actual or the con-
structive removal of a population as one of the genocidal acts specified in 
the Rome Statute.  The most obvious is the forcible displacement of 
children.  Additionally, constructive efforts to remove an ethnic group 
can also be construed as killing members of the group,216 a condition of 
life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction,217 or a 
measure intended to prevent births within the group.218  Note that acts 
without a violent or coercive component—such as burning books, de-
stroying monuments, and prohibiting cultural education or the use of a 
language—do not suffice.  The perpetrator must use “terror-inspiring 
violence to inhibit any potential return by those expelled.”219  Terror-
inspiring acts include murder, rape, torture, imprisonment, theft, and de-
struction of public and private property.220 
                                                 
 215. In the case of actual displacement, the actus reus is the physical removal of the group.  
“The action taken against the individual members of the group is the means used to achieve the 
ultimate criminal objective with respect to the group.”  Report of the International Law Commission 
to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88. 
 216. For example, one constructive effort might include killing some members of a group to 
send a message to other members of an ethnic group that they will be subject to the same fate if they 
do not leave. 
 217. For example, another constructive effort might include contaminating a community’s food 
or water supply or destroying people’s homes and belongings so that group members are forced to 
flee with no means of survival. 
 218. For example, a constructive effort could also include raping women who belong to a 
culture in which premarital sex or extramarital sex leads to banishment from the community.  The 
resulting banishment would effectively preclude women from both belonging to the group and re-
producing with members of their own ethnicity.  Another example may include “procreative rape,” 
which entails forcibly impregnating women of a protected group so that they give birth to children 
who do not belong to the protected group.  See Application of Convention on Prevention and Pu-
nishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 129–30 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 26). 
 219. M. CHERIF BASSIOURI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 609 (1996). 
 220. Id. 
2010] Expanding the Crime of Genocide 525 
B.  Interpreting a Policy of Ethnic Cleansing as Genocidal Intent 
To fully capture the mindset of the ethnic cleanser, international 
courts and tribunals ought to apply the limitations they already employ in 
establishing genocidal intent.  Because the perpetrator need only intend 
to destroy a part of the group,221 international courts and tribunals can 
expect to find the intent to destroy when the targeted ethnic group consti-
tutes a substantial part of the group within a geographically limited 
area.222  Where a policy of ethnic cleansing aims to forcibly remove an 
ethnic group from a substantial geographic region and the portion of the 
group constitutes either a large or a significant portion of the entire eth-
nic group, the intent to destroy is established. 
Instead of interpreting the intent to achieve ethnic homogeneity as 
distinct from the intent to destroy,223 international courts and tribunals 
ought to interpret a policy of ethnic cleansing as a genocidal policy 
where evidence sufficiently meets the stringent requirements for geno-
cidal intent—the specific intent to destroy a protected group “as such.”224  
The already-imposed limitations on genocidal intent will preclude over-
expansion of the crime of genocide while appropriately criminalizing 
ethnic cleansing as genocide. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the recent formation of the ICC, it is crucial that interna-
tional tribunals, courts, and institutions adopt a consistent and conscien-
tious interpretation of genocide.  Genocide is the worst crime known to 
man not only because it causes immense and widespread suffering, but 
because it eliminates a human group.  Losing a human group deprives 
society of the group’s cultural contributions.225  While international 
courts and tribunals acknowledge that the victim of genocide is the 
group, they refuse to interpret the crime of genocide in a manner that 
reflects its culturally destructive harm.  Only by acknowledging the cul-
tural value of protected groups, can international courts and tribunals 
fully realize genocide’s harm to humanity. 
Once international courts and tribunals recognize that genocide and 
ethnic cleansing cause equally permanent and destructive effects, they 
                                                 
 221. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II. 
 222. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 9–10 (Apr. 19, 2004).  See 
also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 146 (Mar. 4, 2009); Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74; 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 89. 
 223. See supra Part III.D. 
 224. See Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 681–703 (Sept. 1, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 551, 569, 581 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
 225. See text accompanying note 139. 
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can properly interpret the crime of genocide and apply its provisions.  
Ethnic cleansers who knowingly deprive an ethnic group of the opportu-
nity to return or reconstitute itself permanently dismember that group.226  
This permanent removal fulfills the meaning of destruction originally 
contemplated by Lemkin and the drafters of the Genocide Convention,227 
for driving an ethnic group out of a region so that its members will never 
truly return denies the group’s existence.  In this way, ethnic cleansing 
satisfies both the actus reus and the mens rea elements of genocide.  
Ethnic cleansers employ the same violent and forcible means as geno-
cide—such as causing slow death or serious bodily or mental harm, de-
priving persons of all means of livelihood, and forcibly transferring 
children.  Moreover, their desire for ethnic homogeneity stems from the 
same degree of intolerance as those who commit genocide.  Thus, those 
who carry out genocidal acts under a policy of ethnic cleansing should be 
convicted of genocide by international courts and tribunals.  Otherwise, 
ethnic cleansers may continue using terror-inspiring violence to achieve 
ethnic purity until the “impure” have nowhere on this earth to go. 
                                                 
 226. See, e.g., Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 977 (holding that “the Bosnian Serb authori-
ties in the ARK implemented a policy to create an ethnically homogeneous ARK [territory], which 
entailed the forcible, unlawful and permanent removal of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats 
from the ARK”); Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 31 (“The transfer completed the removal of all 
Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica, thereby eliminating even the residual possibility that the Muslim 
community in the area could reconstitute itself.”). 
 227. See G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89, (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of 
existence of entire human groups.”); Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 229 (“[B]y the formula-
tion of genocide as a crime, the principle that every national, racial and religious group has a natural 
right of existence is claimed.”); supra Part IV.A. 
